Junw, 1941

ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT, ADMINISTRATIVE
REGULATION AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
JOHN DICKINSON t

In discussing problems connected with what is called public administration and administrative law, confusion not infrequently results
from a failure to understand at the outset what is meant by the term
"administration". A distinguished authority 1 has described administration as essentially the process of translating the general into the
particular, and, as one phase of this process, the task of applying abstract policies, principles and rules to specific cases. From this point of
view, all government classifies itself into two functions: first, the function of formulating policies, principles and rules, and, secondly, the
function of applying them. The first of these two functions is, of
course, primarily that of the legislature, although, within certain limits,
the function of formulating rules and policies can never be completely
divorced from the organ or agency which applies them.
Administration as the function of bringing government to bear
upon particular people in specific situations is thus as broad as the
entire activity of government outside of the legislature. It covers
every point where government comes in direct contact with individuals.
It covers even the action of the judicial courts, as is shown by the
phrase "administration of justice", for the courts themselves are administrative agencies in the sense that through their decisions governmental rules and powers are brought home to particular individuals
and applied to affect their persons and properties. At the opposite
extreme, administration includes the activities of governmental offices
in hiring, promoting and discharging employees. It includes the activity of government in negotiating and contracting with private persons for the purchase of supplies and the construction of public works.
Again, the broad field of administration covers the supply by government of services to individuals ranging all the way from the service
of recording some paper like a deed or a will, through the supply of
public education and unemployment relief, to the sale of water and
electricity. All these fields of administration present problems of organization, management, supervision, and audit, involving questions of
efficiency, economy, fairness, and justice in the larger sense. They
have to do with the operation of government as a going concern-as a
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business, if you will-conducting certain activities for the public which
private persons cannot, or which at a given time and place the legislature thinks they cannot, satisfactorily supply.
These business activities of government, employing and discharging, contracting, buying, selling, planning and carrying out construction work, budgeting and financing, constitute the aspect of administration in which it is synonymous with what we may call management.
This phase of administration is so much to the forefront today that
some students of administration are tempted to identify administration
with management, and to define the administrative process as nothing
but the technique of management. But if we pause and survey the
field of administration as a whole it becomes apparent that there is
another great department of it where the emphasis is in a quite different
direction; I refer to the field of administrative regulation. The Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, the Communications Commission, are not primarily or to any considerable extent engaged in management or business activities; they construct no
roads or buildings or dams, sell no commodities or services, distribute
no funds, and yet from a certain point of view they are administrative
agencies par excellence. This distinction between administrative management and administrative regulation therefore seems basic in any
effort to understand the relation between the administrative process
on the one hand and the judicial process on the other. Which administrative process do we mean when we draw the distinction between
administrative and judicial, the process of administrative management
or the process of administrative regulation?
Let us begin with the process of administrative regulation, the
process which the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Federal
Trade Commission represent; and let us recur to the fact, pointed out
above, that courts themselves are administrative agencies. What is
the relation of an administrative body like the Interstate Commerce
Commission to the administrative bodies of a judicial character which
we call courts? This question raises first of all the inquiry as to what
functions the courts perform in the process of regulation, of bringing
governmental policy home to individuals.
Ever since the emergence of constitutional government in the
middle ages from the cruder and less differentiated forms of government which existed prior to that time, the courts have been the final
and ultimate agency, the agency through which in the last resort,
governmental commands are applied to those individuals who for one
reason or another do not wish to submit without raising some question
of right or justice.
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Before the rise of constitutional government, if an official charged
with the duty of collecting the revenue decided that an individual owed
taxes to the government, there was nothing to prevent his seizing as
much of the individual's property as he saw fit, although the individual
might with good reason protest that no taxes were due. There was
nothing to prevent the government through its police officers from
throwing an individual into prison for an alleged crime, although the
individual might claim that he had never been guilty of the crime.
The establishment and development of judicial procedure in the courts
was the answer of an awakening sense of justice to the oppressiveness
of such governmental action. Today, and for centuries, government
cannot in this country, or in any country living under our AngloAmerican system of law, punish an individual by imprisonment or,
save in a very few exceptional cases, 2 seize his property, without submitting the validity of its action to a judicial procedure in which the
affected individual is entitled to present his case and, if possible, show
that the governmental action involved is not warranted by law. This
is the bulwark which has been built up against such excesses of governmental power as were illustrated, for example, by the famous lettres de
cachet in France, which were warrants issued by executive officials
without application to a court, and under which, without opportunity
for trial or defense, individuals could be subjected, often for purely
3
personal differences, to long terms of imprisonment.
In order to prevent what most of us still feel to be the injustice
of such procedures, the courts, today as in the past, constitute the final
link in the process of regulation, the ultimate point of contact between
government and the individual. There are, however, and necessarily
always have been, administrative stages in the regulatory process preliminary and preparatory to the action of the courts, and in these
preliminary and preparatory stages large and significant changes have
been occurring within the past generation. In order to understand
those changes, it is necessary to go back and contrast the administrative
stages of the regulatory process several generations ago with the
typical organization of those stages today.
Seventy-five years ago when government determined that certain
types of conduct were to be prohibited in the public interest as, for
example, the practice of a bank making excessive loans to its officers
or falsifying its accounts, the normal method was for the legislature
to pass a statute branding the acts in question as criminal and providing a penalty by fine or imprisonment. In the enforcement of such
2. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133 (1894).
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a stathte the phases preliminary to court action were left in the hands
of the prosecuting attorney. He was under a duty to discover, so far
as he could, particular instances where the statute had been violated;
to present such evidence of violations as he might be able to ascertain
to a grand jury; and, if the grand jury returned an indictment, to conduct trial of the defendants in court and secure a conviction if he could
convince a jury of their guilt. In other words, the enforcement of the
regulatory statute followed the same course and was left in the hands
of the same agencies as the enforcement of the general criminal law.
It is a commonplace that one of the outstanding developments of
the last fifty years has been the enormous extension of governmental
regulation into fields of human conduct of a kind not regulated before.
With the entrance of government into this wider field of regulation, it
soon became obvious that the earlier method of administration through
the District Attorney and the common-law courts would be ineffective
and impractical. In the first place, it seemed unfair and unwise, in the
case of many of the regulations which were introduced, to rely for
enforcement upon criminal sanctions. Something less drastic was
desired. In the second place, it was obvious that no single agency like
the District Attorney's office would be adequate to conduct the investigations needed to secure enforcement, of the law in a large number
of such complicated and more or less specialized fields. In the third
place, because of the complex character of many of the problems with
which the regulatory legislation sought to deal, it was apparent that
wise and intelligent enforcement required so far as possible the development of agencies which would be technically expert in each special
field. Out of all these considerations emerged the so-called "regulatory
commission", the type of agency with which the term "administrative"
is today especially associated.
The regulatory commission originated largely as an agency to
take over and perform that phase of the enforcement of a given
regulatory statute which is preparatory to its ultimate enforcement
in the courts, and which, in the case of ordinary criminal law, is still
performed by the District Attorney. Its work, in other words, was
to maintain contact with the special industry or activity regulated, to
make investigations, sift complaints, reach preliminary determinations
as to instances in which a violation had occurred, and then prepare and
submit these cases to the courts. The relative complexity of the issues
with which such commissions had to deal, and the long and detailed
investigation of facts which they were of necessity required to make
before determining that a regulation had been violated, made it practically imperative for these agencies to conduct hearings, compel the
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attendance of witnesses and the production of books and papers, and
hear arguments in substantially the same way that a court would have
to do when the case was ultimately brought into court. After proceedings of this character had been conducted before the commission,
it seemed a futile duplication of effort to require that the evidence
which had been taken and sifted by the commission should be presented
again in court. Accordingly, a change of great significance was effected
in the procedure. It came to be the rule, embodied in practically all
the statutes which have been passed in the last thirty-five years, that
after a commission had taken testimony and reached a determination
it should no longer be necessary for the commission to retry the case
in court, but that, if the individual affected regarded his legal rights
as violated by the determination, he might, before being compelled to
obey, appeal to a court, which would examine the record of the proceedings before the commission for the purpose of determining whether
there was legal ground for the commission's action. The court, if it
found that there was no such ground, would then stay the operation of
the commission's order.
Accordingly, the present situation is that where the enforcement
of statutes is entrusted to an administrative body rather than to the
District Attorney, the courts still occupy an important position and
perform an important function in the process, but a position and a
function much more restricted than under the earlier procedure. They
are still, as always, a last resort to which the individual whose conduct
is being regulated can appeal to support his rights under the law; but
he must generally act on his own motion to obtain their assistance, and
in doing so he is not ordinarily entitled to have the courts look behind
the administrative agency's finding of facts, or to have relief unless
that agency has incorrectly applied the law or has made findings which
are arbitrary and unreasonable on the evidence.
When we speak today of the relation between the judicial process
and the administrative process, what is perhaps most frequently understood is the extent to which the courts are entitled to review decisions
of these regulatory administrative agencies, before those decisions can
be enforced against the individuals to whom they are directed. In
approaching the merits of this issue, it is essential to contrast the
judicial method and the administrative method in so far as they apply
to the task of regulation.
Broadly, three main characteristics may be laid down as marking
the judicial process administered in the courts. In the first place, each
side is permitted to introduce in support of its contentions evidence
having rational probative force and not consisting of mere rumor and
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hearsay, and each side is permitted to cross-examine and object to evidence so offered by the other. Secondly, decision is rendered by reference to known and established principles and rules, of which each side
is in a position, so far as possible, to have advance knowledge and to
which reference can therefore be addressed in argument. Thirdly, the
agency making the decision is supposed to act impartially in the sense
that it is free to decide in favor of either side which makes out the
better case on the basis of the facts and the established rules of decision,
and is not under pressure or compulsion to decide in favor of one side
irrespective of those facts and rules.
Each of these characteristics has become embodied in some special
feature of the judicial process as we observe it in the law courts. The
first characteristic is embodied in the so-called rules of evidence, which
are designed to eliminate from consideration vague impressions and
rumors which may be of a prejudicial character, and which it may be
impossible to rebut or disprove in the way in which definite and specific
facts can be disproved. The second characteristic is embodied in the
requirement that decision must be in conformity with, or at least foreshadowed by, rules or principles of law which are found in the statute
booksor in prior decisions where they can be discovered in advance
by the parties and used as the basis of rational argument, pro and con,
so that a party may not be defeated by some novel principle of decision
invented for the occasion and for the special purpose of deciding
against him. The third characteristic of impartiality is safeguarded
by the organization of the courts as a separate and independent agency,
not under the control of the other agencies of government upon whose
acts they may be required to pass when questioned by individuals.
To a certain extent all three of these outstanding characteristics
of the judicial process may be, and have actually been, carried over
into the administrative process when the latter is employed for the
regulation of private conduct, or, as we say "quasi-judicially", in the
procedure of bodies like the Interstate Commerce Commission. While
it is true that such a body is not bound by all the technical rules of
evidence which were developed to apply to a jury-trial at common law,
it is also true that a commission may not act on mere hearsay or rumor
and that the right of both parties to introduce evidence and to crossexamine is carefully preserved. Similarly, such bodies in their decisions conform to the statutes, and to the interpretative rules and regulations which they themselves have laid down; and they are not permitted to disregard those rules arbitrarily in specific cases. With
regard to independence the analogy is not so complete. In a rateproceeding before a commission, for example, the case against the
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railroad or utility company is very likely to be prepared and conducted
by the commission's own staff, not by an independent officer like a
district attorney before a court; and in consequence we often hear the
charge that administrative justice has an element of unfairness in it
because the same agency acts as both prosecutor and judge. To this
it may be replied that in most instances the administrative agency is
at least independent of the political departments of the govermnent so
that there is no danger that its processes will be perverted into instruments of political pressure or revenge, as in the case of those administrative courts and commissions of the Stuart period in England which
created the distrust of administrative justice that lingers in much of
our thinking still. Secondly, there is the additional safeguard that the
courts in reviewing an administrative order will scrutinize the record
for evidence of unfairness and will uphold the order only if it has a
reasonable support in the evidence.
With these similarities and differences between the judicial process
on the one hand and administrative justice on the other, is it possible
to compare the two so as to express preference for the superior excellence of either? In what sense if at all is it possible to ask whether one
might with advantage be substituted for the other?
What we have at the present time in those fields of regulation
which are committed to administrative agencies is a combination or
blending of administrative with judicial justice. Up to a certain stage
every proceeding follows the administrative pattern; beyond that stage
there is practically always the possibility of resort to the judicial
process. There is room for controversy as to the specific point at which
the line should be drawn in the case of this or that agency or this or
that type of case; but a suggestion in the abstract that-one. pro7 'ss
should give way to the other can only mean either that the administrative process should be abandoned for entire dependence on the courts,
or that the participation of the courts in the process should be eliminated and the administrative process extended to the complete exclusion
of the judicial. It is the latter suggestion which is apparently most
frequently intended when the question is raised today. In weighing
the wisdom of the suggestion there are four points to be kept in mind:
(i) In the first place, the fact that administrative justice follows
the pattern of judicial justice so closely in the essentials of fair play
with regard to the admission and exclusion of evidence, conformity to
law and the like, is to be attributed in no inconsiderable measure to the
fact that administrative tribunals, like the lower law courts, act under
the eye of an appellate court vigilant to correct departures from those
standards. The suggestion that such appellate supervision should be

)

ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION AND JUDICIAL PROCESS

1059

removed in the supposed interest of speed and efficiency raises at least
a suspicion that the objective is to eliminate these safeguards of administrative justice which now surround it and to substitute something
different and more summary or, to use a current expression, "streamlined".
(2) In the second place, this suspicion is strengthened by the fact
that the suggestion is usually accompanied by the complaint that administrative tribunals should be more free than at present to give effect to
what is called "policy" in their decisions. The merit of this contention
depends in large part upon what is meant by "policy". In one sense,
law courts and administrative tribunals alike are already applying
"policy" every day. The courts in the cburse of their decisions are
constantly at work moulding the precedents by slow degrees to such
changes in circumstances and social view-points as they are convinced
represent permanent changes in the national life. On the other hand,
when some more sudden change is desired, legislation or constitutional
amendment announces the new policy, and the courts and administrative tribunals give effect to it. Something more than this, however, is
apparently suggested. What this can be is hard to understand, unless
it is freedom of administrative bodies to alter at their own volition the
policy of a statute, or to enlarge or restrict the statutory mandate from
case to case in accordance with purely external consideration which
would be viewed without favor by an impartial law court but which
might be brought home to the administrative agency in a very practical
way by the exertion of political pressure. This leads to the third consideration.
(3) At present, administrative regulation is largely committed to
independent commissions which, not unlike the courts, occupy a position
outside the purely political branches of government In the case of most
of these agencies, there has been no reason to suspect that they have
done otherwise than attempt to apply the statutes entrusted to their
administration with the full degree of impartiality consistent with the
policy of the statute. There is no suspicion for example that the Interstate Commerce Commission has construed its mandate to enforce
reasonable rates as a mandate to order lower rates where the evidence
and the commission's principles of decision would not justify such an
order. We are beginning, however, to hear expressions of discontent
with this independence of administrative tribunals. The suggestion is
advanced that they should be brought into closer connection with the
day-to-day political policy of government. No doubt the idea would
be repudiated that this means that administrative tribunals should decide
otherwise than on the evidence and in the light of the policy laid down
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by Congress; but how it can mean anything else, it is difficult to perceive. Administrative justice arranged to apply and enforce the shifting political considerations which motivate the day-to-day moves of the
political branches of government would no doubt run afoul of judicial
review as it now exists; but administrative justice of that character
would also be something different from what we know today, and would
amount to a return to what Lord Bacon had in mind when he suggested
that in the interest of "policy" the King should control the decisions of
the Chancellor. The elimination of that kind of administrative justice
was one of the major steps toward free government of the type to
which in this country we have always been accustomed.
(4) Finally, it is suggested that the task and purpose of administrative regulation have radically altered in the last few years. It has hitherto been generally supposed that the object of administrative regulation
was to police certain types of activity and certain kinds of businesses by
requiring them to conform to standards of conduct laid down by legislation. This was the theory upon which administrative regulation was
introduced, and upon which its extension has usually been advocated.
Recently a different theory has been suggested by some students and
commentators. This new theory is that the purpose of administrative
regulation is not to police business conduct, but rather to direct the
management of businesses and industries. In other words, the function
of the administrative body is no longer viewed as that of requiring
from all the units subject to it a general conformity to certain uniform
standards of behavior applicable to all, and stable in their application
until changed for all. Such a body is rather, thought to perform the
very different function of issuing orders and directions to this or that
unit of an industry at this or that particular time, which in the judgment
of the agency seem best adapted to promote the effectiveness of the
industry. On this latter view it might well follow that the standards
which the administrative body saw fit to enforce against one unit of an
industry would be quite different from those which it was enforcing
at the same time against another unit or units; and in the same way the
standards which it enforces today might differ from those which it
would enforce tomorrow, depending upon its judgment at the time as
to the most effective way of accomplishing the ends which it had in
view.

4

4. This seems to be suggested, if not intended, in the following language of Mr.
Justice Frankfurter's majority opinion in Phelps Dodge Corporation v. National
Labor Relations Board, 85 Sup. Ct 753, 761 ('94i).
"The Act does not create rights for individuals which must be vindicated
according to a rigid scheme of remedies. It entrusts to an expert agency the
maintenance and promotion of industrial peace."
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With this suggested alteration in the character and direction of
administrative regulation, we find ourselves back again in the presence
of the other phase of administration which was noted at the outset,
namely, administrative management. The suggestion in effect proposes
to convert administrative regulation into administrative management, or
rather to substitute governmental management for governmental regulation. While hitherto the development of administrative regulation
has been largely towards assimilating it to judicial justice, surrounded
by many of the safeguards of the judicial process, the new suggestion
is to translate it into something like governmental operation, or, by way
of example, to convert the Interstate Commerce Commission or the
Bituminous Coal Commission into an agency not unlike the Tennessee
Valley Authority. The question therefore presents itself as to the relation between administrative management and the judicial process.
The essence of the judicial process is the application of rules,
principles and standards primarily for the purpose of delimiting the
permissible sphere of activity of some individuals in the interest of
others. The objective of management is different, It is not the protection of individuals, but the success of an enterprise, and often the
success of an enterprise involves the sacrifice of individuals. Successful
operation being the objective, the watchword of management is not
uniform standards, equality of treatment, painstaking and impartial
investigation of individual claims, but rather emphasis on quick decisions and sharp reversals of policy which may at one time favor
certain individuals, and then, without warning, disadvantage them for
no fault of their own.
Obviously government like every other human enterprise cannot
function without management, but hitherto the most fruitful field in
which to study the characteristics of management has been the field of
private enterprise. One of the most outstanding of those characteristics
has generally been impatience of rule, regulation and law. No lawyer
who has ever had business men for clients, and no well informed person
who reads the newspapers, can fail to be aware of the way in which
management feels itself cramped and bridled by the restrictions of law
which it regards as hampering its freedom and interfering with its
efficiency. Given these characteristics of management and the manager,
what are we to say of a proposal to substitute governmental management for governmental regulation?
In the field of private enterprise, it has frequently been the exuberance of management and its insistence on efficiency with resulting disregard of the individual which have led to the enactment of regulatory
laws. For example, the successful management and operation of the
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Standard Oil Company was largely responsible for the enactment of
both the Interstate Commerce Act and the Sherman Anti Trust Law.
The success from their own standpoint of certain financial enterprises
had a great deal to do with the enactment of the Public Utility Holding
Company Act and the Securities Exchange Act. Law and regulation,
in other words, in many of their modern forms are primarily designed
to curb management rather than merely to prevent breaches of public
order like the old-fashioned criminal law. This being so, in what sense
can it be said that governmental management may be regarded as a possible substitute for regulation? In that case who would regulate the
managers? Or would they remain unregulated?
The basis for the suggested substitution lies apparently in the fact
that the management which is proposed as an agency of regulation
is not private management, but governmental management in what is
called the public interest. The question may, therefore, be raised as to
whether public management in distinction from private is lac ki'ng in
those characteristics which in the field of private managemert have been
thought to require regulation. If there is a difference, the difference
is embodied in the phrase "public interest". It is true that in the past
there has apparently not been felt to be so much need for legal and
judicial regulation of governmental management as of private enterprise. But it would appear that this has been largely due tothe fact
that until recently governmental enterprise has in the main concerned
itself with such matters as the Army and the Navy where efficiency in
the national defense has been thought largely to override considerations
of private right. On the other hand, where government has taken over
the operation of civil enterprises ranging from schools to water works,
there has been the same tendency to subject management to legal control
through the courts as in fields of private business. Pupils may enforce
their rights to attend public schools 5 and, where municipalities supply
gas or water, they are subject to legal prohibitions against discrimination and unreasonable rates. 6
Is such legal control rendered unnecessary and undesirable by the
supposed management of government enterprises in the public interest?
It may no doubt be urged by those who are impressed with the importance of efficiency and the desirability of relieving management from
the hampering restrictions of regulatory law that in the case of govern5. School Trustees v. People, 87 Ill. 303 (877); Cross v. Walton Common
School District, 121 Ky. 469, 89 S. W. 5o6 (1905) ; Commonwealth v. Altoona School
District, 241 Pa. 224 (1913) ; Kidd v. Joint School District No. 2, 194 Wis. 353, 216
N. W. 499 (927).
6. DicKnisox, ADMINisTRATTE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW (927)
302-305.
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mental enterprises the pursuit of the public interest eliminates the social
desirability of regulatory rules. The difficulty with this argument is
that public interest is a term which ultimately breaks down into a mere
balancing of private interests. Suppose for example that government
should manage the railroads. If the agency charged with the task
should aim at the managerial goal of efficiency it would inevitably find
itself in conflict, like private management, with the claims of shippers
and communities. In the same way a government agency charged with
the operation of -the power industry would probably find itself in conflict with other government agencies managing the coal and oil industries. In such a situation, which is the public interest, the interest of
coal, or the interest of power, or the interest of oil?
Only two devices have been discovered in human experience for
resolving such conflicts. One is the judicial process, operating through
law to weigh and balance the claims of individuals by appeal to principles and standards. The other is the absolute ruler, who might be described in modem terms as a "national general manager", free to
"coordinate" by disregarding all separate claims of whatever character
in the interest of momentary conceptions of governmental efficiency.
The task of such a general manager might well have been supposed to
exceed human capacity if it were not for the living examples which
Europe at present affords us.
Into the comparative merits of absolute government and government through legal procedure, it is not of course worthwhile to enter.
On that subject practically everything has long ago been said, and most
of us have made up our minds one way or the other. For most of us
the answer is written in the history of our own institutions. If we
reach the conclusion that we need not merely management, which we
are bound in any event to have, whether public or private, but also need
law as a check on management, this does not mean that the courts must
be resorted to as the sole agency of legal control. The courts are simply
the ultimate agency, not the sole one. As pointed out above, there is
much by way of enforcing the law which can be done and should be
done within the administration itself. If the place of law in the
management of government is accepted, then regard for law can be
embodied, and needs to be embodied, within the operations of the
administrative agencies themselves. If not embodied there, the insistence on administrative expertness and on standards of proper administrative procedure goes for naught. If, on the other hand, those
standards are actually present in administration, then there is no need
for administrators to object to their work being brought to the ultimate
test of the judicial process as applied in the courts.

